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ABSTRACT
In  recent years,  Latin American governments have been developing public 
policies to promote the use of Information and Communication Technologies 
(ICTs) and, in particular, the use of Internet, as a tool to improve both the 
efficiency  of  government  (through  e-government)  and  the  quality  of 
democracy  (through  e-democracy).  This  paper  focuses  on  e-Democracy, 
however,  a  diagnosis  of  the  context  is  required  in  order  to  asses  its 
developments and potentialities. Thus, the paper proposes an analysis of the 
'state  of  democracy',  with  an overview of the consolidation  and quality  of 
democracy, and some basic indicators of development. The second section 
explores citizens' confidence in the institutions of representative democracy 
and the electoral turnout. A third one, explores the spread and uses of direct 
democracy  mechanisms,  given  that  it  provides   useful  information  about 
current political conflicts and tensions between grassroots-based democracy 
and  concentration  of  power  (often  in  hands  of  the  president).  Finally, 
electronic initiatives to promote transparency, deliberation and participation 
are investigated. By crossing both approaches we want to assess not only the 
actual evolution of e-democracy but also their future potentialities and risks.
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Introduction1
In  the  eighties  and  nineties  in  Western  countries  scholars  were  beginning  to 
comment on a crisis of representative democracy which was becoming evident in 
a  decrease in  participation  in elections,  in the distrust  and lack of  interest  of 
citizens in politics, and in the fall of partisan and union affiliation (Lipset 1992; 
Putnam 2003; Hague and Loader 1999). In this context of crisis, many initiatives, 
including those based on information and communication technologies (ICTs from 
now on), have been developed with the aim of revitalising democracy, increasing 
transparency  in  public  management  and  opening  up  new  spaces  for  political 
participation. 
Even if there are some common points, a look at Latin America shows a different 
picture.  In  most  countries  of  the  region  the  transition  from  dictatorship  to 
democracy began in the eighties. In this sense, far from being “frozen” (as Lipset 
and Rokkan, 1967; or Mair, 1997; suggested for the political parties affiliations in 
Western countries), until now political affiliations have been weak in the majority 
of countries in Latin America which -with a few exceptions (e.g. Uruguay)-  are 
characterized by weak political party system institutionalization, high volatility of 
voters  preferences  from one  election  to  the  next  and  a  more  important  role 
played by charisma than by ideology (e.g. Ecuador, Perú).  Furthermore, although 
democracy has persevered in most cases, it coexists with a recurrent political and 
economical crises, high level of institutional instability, political polarization and 
citizen dissatisfaction. Which role can and should play the ICTs in this scenario? 
The development of e-government is desirable for various reasons that are mainly 
linked  to  improving  the  efficiency  of  public  administration;  that  is,  the 
streamlining of services, the reduction of costs, the reduction of personnel within 
the state bureaucracy and the reduction of waiting times, amongst others. While 
this  was  the  main  argument  with  respect  to  public  administration,  it  was 
accompanied  by  an  emphasis  on  the  potential  for  improving  the  quality  of 
democracy. e-democracy  has  been  defined  as  the  use  of  electronic 
communication as a means for granting citizens the power to make lawmakers 
1 Paper prepared for the 5º Europa-America conference on participatory democracy 29th of 
May  29,  Maison  de  la  Région  Poitou-Charentes,  Poitiers  (France).  Thanks  to  Jonathan 
Wheatley and Uwe Serdült for their useful comments. 
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and politicians accountable for their actions in the public sphere by strengthening 
transparency in the political process, the improvement of the quality of the stages 
of opinion formation or the increase of citizen participation in the decision-making 
process (Trechsel et al 2003: 10). Thus, the uses of technology by governments in 
order to improve their relationship with citizens may be approached from different 
angles. On the one hand, we found issues strictly associated with the quality of 
democracy, which technology could influence when more information on public 
space  management  is  made  available  to  the  citizens,  generating  more 
transparency and opening more and/or better channels of communication with 
them. On the other, technological innovation in the Public Administration may also 
change  the  delivery  of  public  utilities,  increasing  management  efficiency  and 
transparency,  which  would  lead  to  an  improvement  in  levels  of  citizen 
satisfaction. Transparency could also stimulate self-control and reduce the level of 
corruption.  Thus,  an  improvement  of  the  services  delivered  produces 
consequences for the legitimacy of the political system. However, certain elitist 
service developments could also lead to an increase in the differences among 
population groups (those having access, who would benefit from them, and those 
who do not). 
Should  governments  concentrate  their  efforts  in  improving  efficiency, 
transparency  and   accountability  or  should  they  also  aim  to  increase  the 
participation of citizens in decision-making? Is there a risk of reinforcing inequality 
through the promotion of ICT's for democracy in countries with a considerable 
digital divide? Is there a risk of reinforcing populism and concentration of power 
leaving  the  promotion  of  ICT's  in  hands  of  strong  presidents  of  the  sort  that 
prevail in many Latin American countries today? To deal with these questions the 
paper proposes: i) to explore the outputs of democracy in Latin America with an 
overview of indicators of quality of democracy (such as that provided by Freedom 
House), corruption and transparency, access to public information; and also basic 
indicators of welfare (such as per càpita Income and human development) and 
digital divide; ii) the electoral turnout and the ways in which democracy is being 
challenged  by  the  increasing  lack  of  citizen  confidence  in  the  institutions  of 
representative  democracy;  iii)  the  incorporation  and uses  of  direct  democracy 
mechanisms. With the picture of democracy and its trends, we analyze iv) the 
main  developments  of  ICTs  for  democracy  and  good  governance  initiated  by 
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national governments. The paper ends with a conclusion on the trends, risks and 
potentialities.
1.  The  preconditions:  state  of  Democracy,  welfare  and 
development
This research is focused on 17 Latin American countries2. Among these countries, 
democracy has worked continuously  at  least  throughout  the last fifty years in 
Costa Rica (61 years), Colombia (51) and Venezuela (50); for between 21 and 31 
years  in  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Ecuador,  Guatemala,  Honduras,  Nicaragua, 
Peru,  Uruguay;  and for  less than twenty years in Chile  (19),  El  Salvador  (17), 
Paraguay3, Panama (15), and Mexico (9). This suggests that there is no correlation 
between the duration of democracy and the system's stability given that some of 
the older democracies are also the most unnstable or violent, such as Venezuela 
and Colombia respectively; and some of the younger democracies can be included 
in the group of the most consolidated not only in the region but also in the world, 
such Uruguay or Brazil. Secondly, a paradox undergone by most Latin American 
countries  is  frequently  quoted  as  on  the  one  hand,  they  have  more  or  less 
institutionalised a democratic regime as a form of government but, on the other, 
they face a succession of social and political crises. There are abundant examples 
of  this. Many  popular  demonstrations  have  led  to  early  elections  and/or  the 
establishment of transition and provisional governments. Among others, we may 
recall  the fall  of  presidents  Abdalá  Bucarám (1997),  Jamil  Mahuad (1999) and 
Lucio  Gutiérrez  (2005)  in  Ecuador;  Fernando  Color  de  Mello  (1992)  in  Brazil; 
Fernando de la Rúa in Argentina (2001) or Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada (2003) and 
Carlos  Mesa  (2005)  in  Bolivia. Twelve  presidents  in  eight  of  the  seventeen 
countries analyzed here were unable to complete their mandate (see Table 1). 
2 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
3 There is a debate around the point in which democracy was reestablished in Paraguay. 
Since the end of the dictatorship of General Alfredo Stroessner in 1989, the Colorado Party 
won the next four presidential elections, despite administrations repeatedly characterized 
by economic mismanagement and inefficiency, rampant corruption, and almost constant 
inter-factional  power  struggles  within  the party.  Indeed,  to  a  great  extent,  established 
political  and bureaucratic  elites  in  the Colorado Party  have successfully  defended their 
privileges  in  the  new  democratic  environment  and  controlled  many  aspects  of  the 
(unconsolidated)  transition.  It  means  that  there  was  a  continuous  control  of  the  state 
resources by the Colorado's Party during 61 years until 2008, when the ex Catholic priest 
Fernando Lugo arrived to the Presidency as a candidate of a broad coalition. 
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According to Freedom House, nine of the countries studied here were considered 
as  free democracies  in  2008,  being the  other  eight  qualified  as  a  partly  free 
countries. The picture of the corruption and lack of transparency is much worse . 
The Corruption Perceptions Index for 2006 shows that just two countries can be 
considered 'relatively clean' (Uruguay and Chile), while the rest are qualified as 
corrupt or  highly corrupt  (the  latest  applies  for  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Venezuela) (for details see table 
1).  A  third  index  concerning  to  transparency  on  Budgetary  Information  (Open 
Budget  Index)  shows  a  similar  picture.  Among  the  thirteen  Latin  American 
countries analyzed, just Brazil and Peru provide with significant information while 
none shows an  extensive provision, in five the provision is qualified as  minimal 
(Ecuador, El Salvador) or  scant (Bolivia, Honduras, Panama) and the rest of the 
countries  provide  some information  (note  that  Chile  and  Uruguay  were  not 
included  in  this  sample).4 The  lack  of  transparency  not  necessarily  leads  to 
corruption, but is clearly  against the quality of democracy and contributes to hide 
corruption. 
Crossing the Freedom House Index with the Index of Human Development we find 
seven countries  which  are  considered  as  free democracies  with  high  level  of 
Human Development (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Uruguay and 
Panama),  six  are  Partly  free democracies  with  medium level  of  Human 
development (Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay) 
and  four  countries  which  are  free democracy  with  medium level  of  Human 
Development  (El  Salvador,  Peru)  or  partly  free democracies with  high level  of 
Human  Development  (Ecuador,  Venezuela).  On  the  contrary  high  levels  of 
corruption  are  displayed  as  much  in  poorer  (e.g.  Nicaragua)  as  in  wealthier 
countries (e.g. Argentina). The same applies for poverty. The highest proportions 
of the population living below the poverty line are observed not only in those 
countries that are the poorest countries in terms of GDP per capita (Paraguay, 
Nicaragua and Honduras,  with  60% living  below the  poverty  line),  but  also in 
some  of  the  countries  with  relatively  high  GDP  per  capita,  such  as  Brazil  or 
Mexico, where over 30% live below the poverty line.  Until  2007 Latin America 
lived a period of four years of solid economic growth, however, poverty figures 
4  Even if some aspects of the these indicators are controversial the information provided 
and the procedures followed to classify the information results in a valuable assessment 
(for methodological information about the three indexes see the notes in Table 1 and 2)
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went down just slightly. Persistent poverty and corruption have to be considered 
in order to understand citizen's distrust and dissatisfaction.
Another  precondition  for  analysing  the  potentialities  of  ICT's  for   reinforcing 
democracy is that the use and availability of ICT's be sufficiently widespread. As 
several  scholars  have  pointed  out,  widespread  access  to  the  internet  is 
conditional on wealth (Hargittai 1999, Guillén and Suárez 2001, Milner 2002). But 
even if it has been at different speeds and with different consequences for social 
organization, internet diffusion has been remarkable in all the regions of the world 
, including Latin America, where a gradual and considerable increase of users who 
could provide sustenance to these new initiatives is observed (see table 2). Data 
from the International  Telecommunications Union for 2007 show that the most 
advanced countries have around 35% of internet users (Brazil 35%, Costa Rica 
34%), while in some poorer countries access to the internet reamains near or 
below 10 % (Nicaragua 2,8%, Honduras 6%, Paraguay 8.6%, Guatemala 10,2%, 
Bolivia 10.5%, El Salvador 11,1%). Although figures for internet access are low in 
this latter group of countries, with notable exceptions (Nicaragua) they also show 
a constant  and rather rapid growth.  Furthermore, if  we observe the spread of 
other  technologies,  such  as  phone  lines  and  cellular phones  we can see that 
technology has spread throughout  the region when it is perceived as usefuel. In 
any case, the considerable gap between those who have access and those who 
not is an important challenge for governments. 
In  the  next  section,  we  propose  to  analyze  the  role  of  citizens,  with  special 
emphasis  on  turnout  and  confidence  in  the  institutions  of  representative 
democracy.
2.  The  strength  of  political  institutions,  participation,  and 
representation
Given the lack of transparency and the extent to which corruption is endemic to 
most  Latin American countries, is not surprising to find a high level of citizen 
distrust  in  political  institutions.  Although  there  are  remarkable  differences 
between countries, according with CIMA 2008 in all of them citizens trust more in 
the Church (the average confidence was 67%) and Television News (52%) than in 
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Justice  (30%),  Parliament  (22%)  or  Political  Parties  (15%).  In  four  countries, 
confidence in Parliament is less than 10% (Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay and Peru) 
while  the  highest  level  of  confidence  is  displayed  by  Uruguay  (55%)  and 
Venezuela (42%). The situation is even worse for political parties, here with the 
exception of Uruguay (40%) and Guatemala (34%), in all the countries confidence 
is located below 30% with the lowest figures in Bolivia (8%), Chile and Paraguay 
(5%), Ecuador and Peru (4%). (See table 3)
Despite the  bad results quoted above, polls such as Latinobarómetro and CIMA 
show that governments are steadily becoming more popular and many political 
institutions  somewhat  more  trusted.  Comparing  data  for  2002  and  2008  for 
parliament  and political  parties we can observe than in most of  the countries 
confidence has increased (considerably in cases such as Uruguay and Venezuela) 
while  just  in  three  it  has  continued  to  fall  (Chile,  Perú  and  Costa  Rica). 
Latinobarómetro 2007 suggest that Latin Americans are becoming disillusioned 
with the market economy and they want a fairer distribution of income and a 
state that gives greater social protection. Unfortunately, this feeling is leading to 
democracy losing its position as the preferred system of government. Only 54% of 
respondents were convinced democrats and in only five countries has support for 
democracy  risen  since  the  previous  year:  in  Costa  Rica  and  Panama,  where 
popular  social-democratic  leaders  are  in  office,  and  in  Bolivia,  Ecuador  and 
Nicaragua,  whose left-wing presidents,  respectively Evo Morales,  leader of  the 
Movement  for  Socialism (Movimiento al  Socialismo);  Rafael  Correa leader of  a 
coalition created by himself in 2006, Alliance PAIS, and Daniel Ortega Sandinista 
National  Liberation  Front  (Frente  Sandinista  de  Liberación  Nacional  or  FSLN), 
represent  constituencies  who  have  previously  felt  excluded  from  power.  We 
should mention that while the popularity of democracy has increased in these 
three countries, that of political parties has continued to fall (see table 3). This 
suggests  that  leaders  are  increasing  their  power  against  institutions  of 
representative democracy. Only in Uruguay does the pattern seem to be different, 
following the arrival in power of the Broad Front (Frente Amplio), which broke the 
traditional  Uruguayan  bipartidism  and  has  reinforced  the  role  of  the  political 
parties. 
Electoral  turnout  has to be considered,  given that  the discourse promoting  e-
democracy has underlined the potential of ICT to increase it. It should be noted 
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that in a good proportion of the Latin American countries voting is compulsory. 
However countries either do not enforce compulsory voting laws (i.e Bolivia, Costa 
Rica, Guatemala, Paraguay and Honduras) or the enforcement is weak (Argentina, 
Brazil,  Ecuador,  Mexico,  Peru  and  Chile).  Thus,  despite  compulsory  voting,  it 
seems that these 'laws are created to merely state the government's  position 
regarding what the citizen's responsibility should be'5. In any case, the average 
turnout  in  the  six  last  elections  (parliamentary  and  presidential)  is  67%,  with 
strong differences between the highest turnout -Uruguay with 90,7% (and strict 
enforcement of compulsory voting)- and the lowest -Colombia with 36,6% and El 
Salvador with 45% on average. The lowest turnout is registered in the countries in 
which  voting  is  not  compulsory.  However,  also  countries  without  compulsory 
voting  show low turnout  (Guatemala,  48% or Mexico 59%) and countries  with 
compulsory voting shows turnout above the average (as Nicaragua with 70% or 
Panama 75%) (see table 4). 
A surprising finding emerges from the evolution of the number of the registered 
voter's  over time. By analizing the increase of registered voters from the first 
election of the eighties until the last (e.g. for Ecuador since the elections of 1984 
to the elections in 2006) a huge increase of the voters is observed. In the case of 
Ecuador the electoral roll increased by 145% during the twenty-two year period 
while  the  natural  increase  of  population  for  the  same  period  was  just  51%, 
meaning that at least 62% of the increase in the registered voters comes from the 
extension  of  political  rights  (probably  indigenous  and  rural  population  not 
registered previously).  A similar picture emerges for several  other countries in 
which a huge increase in the number of voters cannot be explained by the natural 
increase  in  the  population.  This  quantitative  extension  of  political  rights  also 
exceed 40% (over and above the natural increase in the population) in Brazil, El 
Salvador,  Guatemala,  Honduras,  Mexico,  Nicaragua,  Panama  and  Peru  (for 
detailed information see table 4). Only in Chile and Costa Rica does the opposite 
apply,  I.e  the increase in population outweighs the increase in the number  of 
registered voters (a relative fall in the number of registered voters of 14% and 3% 
respectively). The large anomaly in Chile can be explained by the fact that one is 
required to vote only if is a registered voter, but is not compulsory to register. 
This apparent drop in the proportion of the population that is registered to vote 
could therefore be explained by a failure to register. 
5 http://www.idea.int/vt/compulsory_voting.cfm
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3.  Opening  democracy  (I)?  The  case  of  Direct  Democracy 
Mechanisms6
In  recent  times  there  has  been  observed  a  remarkable  increase  in  both, 
constitutional  reforms  to  introduce  or  extend  direct  democracy  mechanisms 
(DDMs) as well as calls for a referendum. More than 40% of the referendums to 
have occurred in Latin America in the last fifty years have been carried out in the 
last decade. The explanation for this evolution is unclear.  Barczak (2001) argue 
that  'the  introduction  of  direct  democracy  mechanisms  is  typically  driven  by 
traditionally  excluded political  interests.  It  takes two forms,  both involving the 
failure of representative democratic institutions. In most cases, these traditionally 
excluded  interests  win  control  over  the  constitutional  reform  and  rewriting 
process, although this is not a necessary condition for the emergence of direct 
democracy'.  Even  if  this  condition  applies  in  the  most  controversial  cases 
(Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador), it has to be underlined that both governments 
on the left and governments on the right have promoted the inclusion of DDMs, 
(e.g. Venezuela 1999, Peru 1993). Although in some countries the introduction of 
DDMs has been a response to   citizens'  demands  for  more participation  (e.g. 
Colombia 1991),  this  has  not  been the case in others (e.g.  Costa Rica 2006). 
Moreover, DDMs have been introduced both against the backdrop of a serious 
political crisis (e.g. Bolivia 2004) and in the absence of such crisis   (Brazil 1988, 
2003).  Some  scholars  have  also  underlined  the  risks  of  manipulation  and  a 
tendency  towards  populism  which  could  be  promoted  by  the  referendum  in 
presidential regimes. DDM includes a broad range of mechanisms which can lead 
to different results and can take different forms ('bottom up', 'top down' and a 
combination of both). The picture of norms and practices of DDMs shows a huge 
variation amongst Latin American Countries (see table 5).
We  should  note  that  a  large  group  of  countries  have  never  used  DDMs  (El 
Salvador,  Honduras,  Paraguay,  and Nicaragua)  or  have used them only  rarely 
(Argentina, Guatemala, Peru and Costa Rica) even though they have introduced 
them in a formal sense. Costa Rica is a special case given that a consultation 
occurred  after  the  constitutional  amendment  (2006)  which,  among  others, 
6 This section is based in a previous research on direct democracy mechanisms in LA (Welp 
2009).
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allowed  DDMs  as  a  bottom  up  mechanism  and  raised  the  promotion  of 
participatory democracy. However, despite  the new law, the call was initiated by 
presidential decree and in the context of growing political polarization around the 
acceptance or rejection of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States. Peru 
(1993) and Guatemala (1994) show a contradictory pattern. In both countries the 
president (Alberto Fujimori, and Jorge Serrano, respectively) closed the Parliament 
in  a  self-suspending  democracy  and  received  the  weight  of  international 
opposition.  A referendum allowed Fujimori  to  give  a  democratic  veneer  to  its 
management and stay in power (until 2000). Serrano was forced to resign and 
and was the new government, during the reorganization of the political system, 
who  called  for  a  referendum  to  legitimize  the  process.  From  theses  cases 
emerged a common point which is the flexible interpretation or clear violation of 
the  law.  This  was  clear  in  the  case  of  Fujimori,  but  also  in  Costa  Rica  the 
procedure to call the referendum was not the one stablished by the constitution. 
In a second group are located countries that have conducted some referendums, 
such as Brazil, Colombia, Panama. In Brazil there have been three consultations, 
but, except the last one, which opened a debate on keeping and bearing arms, 
subject of public interest given the murder rate in this country,  none of these 
consultations appear to have greater impact on the definition of public policies. 
According with his Constitution, Panama has used the mechanism mainly to take 
decisions about the Channel.
The most intensive users of the referendum are Uruguay, Ecuador, Venezuela and 
Bolivia7. Auer (2007) points out that in Uruguay, 'unlike in many other countries of 
the continent, but like in Switzerland, these devices are not at the disposal of the 
executive power but depend on the will of the people itself and on parliament'. 
This explains decades of prodigious use and continuous experiences with direct 
democracy  mechanisms  that  have  acted  as  a  strong  factor  of  political 
legitimization,  promoted  political  consensus  and  brought  about  the  most 
consociational regime in South America.  In the other three cases in which direct 
democracy plays a crucial role, conflict is the main feature of the system. The 
weak  institutionalization  of  the  political  party  system  and  the  increasing 
7 These four cases are responsible for almost 75% of referendums to be held in the last 25 
years, and Uruguay has conducted a third of the total number of referendums in the last 
fifty years.
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dissatisfaction of the citizenry with the government parallel with social exclusion 
and political inclusion (in the minimalistic sense of basic political rights such as 
the right to vote) has promoted a radical change in these political systems. Direct 
democracy has become a potent weapon to resolve situations of political impasse. 
In these cases the most common reason to call for a referendum is an attempt to 
resolve a struggle between parliament and the president or the president and the 
governors or authorities of the opposition. Consultations initiated by the president 
accompany profound political and social conflict. In this scenario, with minimum 
guarantees of the rule of law, the dispute between the traditional power removed 
from  the  government  and  the  new  movements  creates  intensive  ideological 
polarization and 'dirty'  campaigns.  We should underline that in Venezuela and 
Bolivia it is not only the president that uses the referendum. The constitutional 
reforms  which  introduced  or  increased  direct  democracy  also  allow  citizens, 
organizations, political parties or whoever else to collect signatures and call for a 
referendum. This occurred in Venezuela in 2004 and on several occasions in the 
Bolivia's instable and conflictive democracy. Despite the questionable ability of 
these  mechanisms to  produce  an open democratic  debate,  let  me stress  that 
direct democracy has provided an institutional arena to resolve political conflict. 
While the immediate effect of the referendum is a high social polarization, in the 
long run it could be a first step towards acceptance of the rules of the democratic 
game.
4. Opening Democracy (II)? The promotion of ICT's for democracy
Finally  we  can  analyze  the  spread  of  e-democracy  by  the  Latin  American 
governments.  In  order  to  examine  what  type  of  actions  are  promoted,  while 
considering the peculiarities of each of the analyzed countries, ee have searched 
for initiatives oriented towards: i. the citizen's right to access public information; 
ii. efficiency in the delivery of public services; and iii. Citizens' participation as a 
fundamental right . To this end, we have focused on initiatives that are developed 
by the national or federal government and that are available on the Web8.
By analyzing the government portals, we distinguished three different types of 
device: portals that are a means to communicate government activities (typically 
8 The fieldwork was done between December 2006 and march of 2007. A complete report 
can be consulted in Welp 2007 (in English) or Welp 2008 (an updated version in Spanish).
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these are  more an exercise in propagandist than a genuine device to provide 
information),  those  organized  by  the  administration  offer  that  offer  technical 
information and legal acts, and those organized in a more user-friendly manner to 
satisfy citizens’ needs (e.g. by profile, theme and/or key facts). In many cases, 
there is both a government portal and a presidential portal operating in parallel, 
the  latter  one  frequently  having  clear  propagandist  purposes. There  are  also 
portals that have a lot of different types of information on their home page, thus 
creating  a  complicated  map  of  scarcely-accessible  information. Most 
governmental portals directed to provide information about the government itself 
do not have a guide of procedures (explaining when, where and how to do specific 
procedures and in the most developed systems allowing to do it online) and, in 
general, there are no real initiatives oriented to the administrative reform and the 
promotion  of  better  services  (Ecuador,  Honduras,  Guatemala,  Dominican 
Republic). However, Honduras and Guatemala, although they have not developed 
this  type  of  initiative,  do  have  electronic  systems  for  state  purchasing  and 
procurement. As a general finding, most portals are organized as citizen-oriented 
portals  (8  cases);  most  are  also  organized  according  to  the  offering  of  the 
administration, with information on programs and governmental units (7 cases) 
stand out; and finally, some portals operate as a new window on governmental 
activity (4 cases). (See detailed information in Table 6) 
As an initiative related to transparency and the reduction of corruption but also 
with consequences for administrative modernization and the internal efficiency of 
management,  the  setting  up  of  state  contracting  and  procurement  systems 
stands  out.  The  majority  of  latin  American  countries  have  developed  these 
systems,  except  for  El  Salvador,  Mexico,  Dominican  Republic,  Nicaragua  and 
Venezuela. In  the  cases  where  the  system  operates  electronically,  ICTs  are 
described as a source of transparency, efficiency (as the aim is to increase the 
number of suppliers and to improve the quality-price ratio) and promotion of ICTs 
use (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, among others). Many of these initiatives or others 
oriented towards transparency and the access to public information have been 
developed with international cooperation funds (Costa Rica, Panama, Honduras, 
Bolivia,  Peru).  We found that  cases with lower levels  of  wealth  and spread of 
technology such as Bolivia, Panama and Peru. Among the reflections made, in the 
first  place  we  should  highlight  the  influence  of  the  economic  support  of 
international  organizations in the development of this kind of initiatives. In the 
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second place, we identified the need for a concrete approach to the practices, 
uses and outcomes, allowing us to differentiate rhetoric from concrete actions. 
This  becomes  particularly  evident  in  iniatives  oriented  towards  citizen 
participation, which generally lack of any explanatory framework concerning the 
real consequences citizen participation could have.
We explored initiatives for citizen participation, ranging from more basic forms (e-
mail  delivery)  to  the  possibility  of  submitting  bills  or  requesting  specialized 
information,  or  the creation of  interactive spaces to have an influence on the 
design of public policies. Here we may see a greater difference among actions 
because, while in some cases the creation of sectorial forums, for example, has 
been promoted (Mexico, Bolivia) or virtual legislative programs in which citizens 
may participate have been created  (such as the virtual Parliament in Peru and 
Chile), in other cases, the appeal to citizens is mainly symbolic, as in the case of 
virtual  mailboxes  to  write  to  the  President  (Paraguay).  It  is  important  to 
differentiate the opening of 'symbolic' spaces of participation from spaces where 
it  is  possible  to  raise  and  follow-up  proposals,  and  from  spaces  of  citizen 
interaction designed for the formulation of bills. Most of the latter were developed 
by the legislative assembly. 
The  portals  of  the  legislative  power  have  also  spread,  with  the  exception  of 
Honduras. Among  them,  it  is  important  to  differentiate  those  providing 
information from those that have implemented more advanced systems for citizen 
participation, either through individual  access and submission of proposals and 
questions and/or through the creation of discussion forums (Panama, Peru). As 
was noted for Frick (2005) in a previous research, 'For the time being, initiatives 
respond to the  object  of  enhancing  information  and opinion instances of  both 
citizens  and  electors;  only  exceptionally,  do  these  initiatives  respond  to  the 
strengthening  of  the  political  process’  transparency  or  to  higher  effective 
involvement and participation of citizens in the decision-making process'. 
5. Final Remarks
To  sum up,  Latin  America  is  characterized  by  a  high  level  of  corruption  and 
poverty,  increasing  distrust  in  the  institutions  of  representative  democracy, 
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increasing  political  conflict  and  polarization  within  the  framework  of  recurrent 
political crises. These crises mainly stem from inequality and poverty but but are 
exacerbated by corruption and/or as a result of the failure of elected governments 
to comply with their electoral programs. In this context, how are ICTs being used 
to contribute to reinforce good governance and democracy? 
First of all, despite the digital gap, the promotion of ICTs is significant and has 
gained an increasing weight. The use of ICTs by Latin American governments is 
widespread. All of them have developed government portals and have strategic 
and/or action plans. With different emphases and consequences, all these actions 
could contribute to citizens’ satisfaction, the legitimacy of the political system and 
governance, both in terms of increased control over governments (which would 
put  pressure on those governments  to improve their results),  and in terms of 
improving  the  services  delivered  or  the  capacity  of  the  citizens  to  submit 
proposals or have a say beyond elections. However, the situation among countries 
is diverse and analyzing the way ICTs are used is complex. 
While e-government (i.e. the use of ICT to improve efficiency and quality of the 
public administration) seems to have a clear place in the governmental agenda, 
e-democracy  (understood  as  the  use  of  ICT  to  increase  citizen's  access  to 
information and open new channels for participation) has an uncertain place. Such 
policies  have  been  directed  in  particular  towards  the  creation  of  both 
transparency  in  governance  and  the  improvement  of  citizen  satisfaction  with 
public  administration,  both of  which are more linked with the improvement  of 
accountability and public service satisfaction than with democratic participation in 
decision-making process. 
Institutional instability in Latin American countries is reinforced by the fact that 
elections are the primary mechanism of accountability. Elections are central  to 
democratic  life,  but are not enough to promote responsible  governments.  The 
Uruguayan case is  emblematic,   direct  democracy  has  played a constant  role 
allowing the voters to propose laws or to act against unpopular policies. In this 
case citizens have in their  hands a mechanism that  allows them to intervene 
directly  in  the  process  of  policy  making.  By  contrast,  in  countries  where  a 
significant segment of the public has been excluded from access to public goods 
and lack institutional mechanisms at their disposal, discontent and spontaneous 
19
C2D Working Paper Series 31/2009
protest are common. This is a democratic voice, but often arrives too late, as the 
Argentinian crisis of 2001 demonstrates, when half of the population fell below 
the poverty line. 
New political actors and respect for the rules of the democratic game is forcing an 
opening up the system. Latin America needs more and better channels for citizens 
to  make decisions;  however,  strong political  leaderships  and the digital  divide 
invite  us  to  be  cautious.  Latin  America  needs  better  institutions  for  a  better 
government. In this sense, there is no doubt about the benefits of an efficient and 
transparent government.  Transparency in government activities has an effect of 
control on the government, and of learning for citizens, who will be more qualified 
for  decision making.  The fight  against  corruption and access to information of 
public interest is maybe not revolutionary, but can encourage important changes 
in a region in constant movement.
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Tabla 1: Year of the transition to democracy, government interrupted and assessment of democracy and corruption
Country Year 
Transition 
Resignations by popular pressure 
(since 1980)
Freedom and 
Democracy 1
Corruption2
PR CL Status Rank CPI Scores
Open Budget 
Index3
Argentina 1983 26 2001 (Fernando De la Rúa) 2 2 Free 93 2,9 Highly corrupt 56 Some
Bolivia 1982 27 1985 (Hernán Silas Suazo) 
2003 ( Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada)
2005 (Carlos Mesa) 
3 3 Partly Free 105 2,7Highly corrupt 6 Scant
Brasil 1985 24 1992 ( Fernando Color de Mello) 2 2 Free 70 3,3  Corrupt 74 Significant
Chile 1990 19 -- 1 1 Free 20 7,3 na
Colombia 1958 51 -- 3 4 Partly Free 59 3,9  Corrupt 60 Some
Costa Rica 1948 61 -- 1 1 Free 55 4,1  Corrupt 45 Some
Ecuador 1979 30 1997 (Abdalá Bucarám) 
1999 (Jamil Mahuad) 
2005 (Lucio Gutiérrez)
3 3 Partly Free 138 2,3 Highly corrupt 38 Minimal
El Salvador 1992 17 -- 2 3 Free 57 4  Corrupt 37 Minimal
Guatemala 1986 23 1993 (JorgeSerrano Elías) 3 4 Partly Free 111 2,6 Highly corrupt 45 Some
Honduras 1982 27 -- 3 3 Partly Free 121 2,5 Highly corrupt 11 Scant
México 2000 9 -- 2 3 Free 70 3,3  Corrupt 54 Some
Nicaragua 1979 30 -- 4 3 Partly Free 111 2,6 Highly corrupt 18 Scant
Panamá 1994 15 -- 1 2 Free 84 3,1 Corrupt na
Paraguay 1993 164 1999 (Raúl Cubas Grau) 3 3 Partly Free 111 2,6 Highly corrupt na
Perú 1980 29 2000 (Alberto Fujimori) 2 3 Free 70 3,3 Corrupt 66 Significant
R.Dominicana 1978 31 1994 ( Joaquin Balaguer) 2 2 Free 99 2,8 Highly corrupt 11 Scant
Uruguay 1985 24 -- 1 1 Free 28 6,4 na
Venezuela 1959  50 1993 (Carlos Andrés Pérez) 4 4 Partly Free 141 2,3 Highly corrupt 35 Minimal
Source: Information based on the history of each country, Freedom House, Transparency International and Open Budget Index.
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(1) Freedom and Democracy: PR and CL stand for political rights and civil liberties, respectively; 1 represents the most free and 7 the least 
free rating. The ratings reflect global events from January 1, 2008, through December 31, 2008.The ratings reflect an overall judgment 
based on survey results and then assigns each country and territory a broad category status of Free (for countries whose ratings average 
1.0 to 2.5),  Partly Free (3.0 to 5.0), or Not Free (5.5 to 7.0). According with Freedom House, the survey does not rate governments or 
government performance per se, but rather the real-world rights and social freedoms enjoyed by individuals. Freedoms can be affected by 
state  actions,  as  well  as  by  nonstate  actors,  including  insurgents  and  other  armed  groups.  (See  Methodology  Summary 
www.freedomhouse.org)
(2) Corruption Perception Index 2006.  Transparency International.  http://www.transparency.org    CPI Score' relates to perceptions of the 
degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analyst and ranged between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt)
(3) Open Budget Index 2008.The Survey is based on a questionnaire that is intended to collect a comparative dataset in 85 countries. It 
groups questions into  three sections:  1)  the dissemination of  budget  information,  2)  the executive’s  annual  budget  proposal  to  the 
legislature and the availability of other information that would contribute to analysis of budget policies and practices, and 3) the four 
phases of the budget process.   The countries that scored between 81-100 are placed in the performance category Provides Extensive 
Information , those with scores 61-80 % in  Provides Significant Information, those with scores 41-60 % in  Provides Some Information, 
those with  scores 21-40  % in  Provides Minimal  Information,  and  those  with  scores  0-20 % in  Provides  Scant  or  No Information . 
http://www.openbudgetindex.org/
(4) It is difficult to fix a date for the transition in Paraguay. Could be consider that it start when the dictator period finish (1989) or when the 
Partido Colorado lost the power in free elections after 61 years of full control of the state in 2008. Here we decided to put an intermediate 
date.
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Table 2: Human Development, GDP per cápita , Poverty, telephone lines, cell phones and Internet Spread
Human 
Development 1
GDP 
(PPP) per 
cápita 2
Poverty3 Subscribers per 100 inhabitants 
20074
Internet Users5
Poverty Extreme 
poverty
Telephone Mobile Cellular 2001 2003 2005 2007
Argentina 0.86 high 13,244 23,8 8,2 126 102 9.8 11.9 17.7 25.9
Bolivia 0.72 medium 4,208 54 31 41 34 2.1 3.5 5.2 10.5
Brazil 0.81 high 15,570 30 8.5 84 63 4.5 9.9 19.5 35.2
Chile 0.87 high 13,885 13.7 3.2 104 84 19.9 25.1 17.2 30.9
Colombia 0.79 medium 6,958 46.8 20.2 91 74 2.7 7.1 10.5 26.2
Costa Rica 0.85 high 10,658 18.6 5.3 66 34 9.6 21.5 25.4 33.6
Ecuador 0.81 high 7,397 42.6 16 89 76 2.7 4.4 4.7 13.1
El Salvador 0.75 medium 5,735 47.5 19 105 90 2.3 8.3 9.3 11.1
Guatemala 0.70 medium 4,483 54.8 29.1 66 76 1.7 4.6 7.9 10.2
Honduras 0.71 medium 3,682 68.9 45.6 40 30 1.4 2.7 3.6 6
Mexico 0.84 high 12,780 31.7 8.7 83 64 7.5 12.1 18.1 20.7
Nicaragua 0.70 medium 2,485 61.9 31.9 37 38 1.5 2.0 2.7 2.8
Panama 0.83 high 11,623 29 12 86 72 4.0 5.5 6.4 22.2
Paraguay 0.75 medium 4,332 60.5 31.6 78 71 1.1 2.1 3.4 8.6
Peru 0.79 medium 7,842 44.5 16.1 65 55 7.6 10.5 16.4 27.4
Uruguay 0.86  high 11,236 21,7 1,7 119 90 11.2 16.0 20.2 29
Venezuela 0.83  high 12,168 28.5 8.5 105 86 4.7 7.5 12.5 20.7
0,79 -- 40.8 17.8 81 67 4.5 8 10.8 19.6
Sources: UNDP 2008, World Bank 2008, ECLAC 2007, ITU
(1) The HDI combines three dimensions: Life expectancy at birth, as an index of population health and longevity;  Knowledge and education, as measured by the adult literacy rate (with 
two-thirds weighting) and the combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrollment ratio; and Standard of living, as measured by the natural logarithm of gross domestic product 
(GDP) per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) in United States dollars. UNDP: http://hdr.undp.org/en/
(2)Per capita values were obtained by dividing the PPP GDP data by the Population data. Comparisons of national wealth are frequently made on the basis of purchasing power parity 
(PPP), to adjust for differences in the cost of living in different countries.  PPP  removes the exchange rate problem. Given that has its own drawbacks PPP per capita figures are more 
narrowly spread than GDP per capita figures. World Development Indicators database, 2008.  http://www.worldbank.org/
(3) Data from ECLAC but for Argentina and Uruguay data is from INDEC and INE respectively Poverty is defined as the percentage of the population having incomes amounting to less 
than twice the cost of a basic food basket and includes indigent population. Indigence is measured as the percentage of the population having incomes amounting to less than the cost 
of basic food basket.  http://www.eclac.org/publicaciones/xml/7/35327/LCG2399B_1.pdf (pg 55)
(4) ITU 2007, http://www.itu.int
(5) Data for 2001, 2003 and 2005 is from the World Bank. Data for 2007 is from the International Telecommunications Union. 
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Tabla 3:  Trust and Confidence in institutions (2002, 2005 and 2008) and preference for Democracy as a system of government
Country Church TVNews Parliament Political 
Parties
Justice Democracy is preferable to any other 
type of government
2002 2008 2002 2008 2002 2008 2002 2008 2002 2008 1996 2001 2007
Change since 
2006
Argentina 57 53 53 51 7 13 8 10 19 22 71 58 63 -11
Bolivia 79 82 70 43 16 27 6 8 20 35 64 54 67 5
Brazil 61 68 50 59 16 23 6 13 23 41 50 30 43 -3
Chile 56 53 60 49 29 11 12 5 22 14 54 45 56 -10
Colombia 79 71 55 63 22 29 19 20 42 47 60 36 47 -6
Costa Rica 68 64 72 61 31 19 19 17 48 26 80 71 83 8
Ecuador 73 70 71 61 na 5 na 4 20 15 52 40 65 11
El Salvador na 89 na 44 na 22 na 16 na 38 56 25 38 -13
Guatemala na 72 na 33 na 22 na 34 na 36 50 33 32 -9
Honduras 88 84 67 64 28 31 18 26 na 26 42 57 38 -13
Mexico 57 59 65 60 26 30 21 12 24 31 53 46 48 -6
Nicaragua na 72 na 69 na 22 na 14 na 33 59 43 61 5
Panama 80 81 59 52 8 9 8 11 28 15 75 34 62 7
Paraguay na 71 na 69 na 9 na 5 na 17 59 35 33 -8
Peru 73 63 49 41 24 7 10 4 19 16 63 62 47 -8
Uruguay 37 31 62 36 29 55 25 40 45 61 80 79 75 -2
Venezuela 74 55 77 34 15 42 11 15 21 36 62 70 67 5
Average 68 67 62 52 21 22 14 15 28 30 61 48 54 -2,3
Sources: 
(1)  Barómetro  Iberoamericano  de  Gobernabilidad  2002,  2005  y  2008,  Consorcio  Iberoamericano  de  Investigaciones  de  Mercados  y  Asesoramiento. 
www.cimaiberoamerica.com
(2) Latinobarómetro 2007
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Table  4:  Natural  and  non natural  increase  of  registered  voters,  extension  of  political  rights  and turnout  in  the  last  three  Presidential  and 
Parliamentary elections
Country % increase 
reg. voters1 
% increase 
population2
% increase 
non natural3
Turnout
average 4
Presidential Parliamentary
Vote 1 Vote 2 Vote 3 Vote 1 Vote 2 Vote 3
Argentina 45,6 37,06 6 74,4 1999 78,6 2003 76,9 2007 71,8 2001 75,2 2005 70,9 2007 73,1
Bolivia 83,2 71,46 7 76 1997 71,4 2002 72,1 2005 84,5 1997 71,4 2002 72,1 2005 84,5
Brazil 113,7 48,13 44 78,6 1998 78,5 2002 79,5 2006 83,2 1998 78,5 2002 68,7 2006 83,3
Chile 8,8 25,85 -14 87,8 1993 90,5 1999 90,6 2005 83,9 1997 87,3 2001 86,6 2005 87,7
Colombia 93,8 53,78 26 36,6 na na 2002 46,4 2006 45,1 1998 45 2002 42,5 2006 40,5
Costa Rica 71 76,8 -3 66,5 1998 70 2002 60,2 2006 65,2 1998 70 2002 68,8 2006 65,1
Ecuador 145,8 51,28 62 63,9 1998 70,1 2002 62,9 2006 76 1998 47,3 2002 63,5 2006 63,5
El Salvador 137,6 41,4 68 45,0 1994 46,2 1999 38,6 2004 66,2 2000 38,1 2003 28,4 2006 52,6
Guatemala 154,2 72,75 47 48,5 1999 40,4 2003 46,8 2007 48,1 1999 40,4 2003 54,5 2007 60,5
Honduras 223,3 101,94 60 62,9 1997 72,1 2001 66,3 2005 55,1 1997 71,8 2001 66,3 2005 46
Mexico 126,4 47,24 54 59,8 1994 78,5 2000 64 2006 58,6 2000 57,2 2003 41,7 2006 58,9
Nicaragua 136,2 52,73 55 70,4 1996 76,4 2001 n/a 2006 61,2 1996 77,1 2001 n/a 2006 66,7
Panama 117,9 49,08 46 75,2 1994 73,7 1999 76,2 2004 n/a 1994 73,7 1999 75,9 2004 76,3
Paraguay 152,7 100,92 26 69,8 1998 80,5 2003 64,2 2008 60,3 1998 80,5 2003 64 2008 65,5
Peru 154,3 63,75 55 84 2000 82,6 2001* 81,4 2006 87,7 2000 82 2001 81,4 2006 88,7
Uruguay 13,2 10,44 3 90,7 1994 91,4 1999 91,8 2004 88,3 1994 91,4 1999 91,7 2004 89,6
Venezuela 83,5 60,86 14 53,9 1998 58,3 2000* 56,5 2006 74 1998 52,6 2000 56,6 2005 25,3
Average 109,5 56,8 34,4 67 -- 72,4 -- 66,5 -- 69,2 -- 66,5 -- 64,2 -- 65,9
Source: Owner calculation based on IDEA (http://www.idea.int/vt/) for registered voters and turnout; and on World Development Indicators database and CIA 
World Factbook for population.  
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(1) In order to calculate the increase in the registered electors was considered the number of people allowed to vote in the first parliamentary election 
of the eighties and the number of allowed voters in the last parliamentary election (the research was done in April 2009).Argentina 1983-2007; 
Bolivia 1980-2005; Brazil 1982-2006; Chile 1989-2005; Colombia 1982-2006; Costa Rica 1982-2006; Ecuador 1984-2006; El Salvador 1988-2006; 
Guatemala  1982-2007;  Honduras  1980-2005;  Mexico  1982-2006;  Nicaragua  1984-2006;  Panamá  1984-2004;  Paraguay  1983-2008;  Peru 
1980-2006; Uruguay 1984-2004; Venezuela 1983-2005. 
(2) The column shows the increase of the population in the same period selected for the previous column (% increase of the registered voters) 
(3) The columns shows the variation in the registered voters which can not be explained by natural increase of population but by other reason like the 
extension of political rights to more population. 
(4) Voting is compulsory in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay and is 
not compulsory in Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama and Venezuela..
* A few months after assuming the Fujimori's controversial third term a serious institutional crisis broke. Fujimori resigned from Japan and a new 
election was called. In Venezuela, Chavez assumed in 1999 and convened a constituent assembly to reform the constitution. After the adoption its 
early elections were called to ratify various mandates under the new constitution. 
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Table 5. Direct Democracy Mechanisms used at the National level 1958-2009
Country
Mandatory 
referendum
Who can call for a  referendum? Experiences
President Parliament Citizenry Year/Origen
Influence of 
Direct 
Democracy4
Argentina NO SI (No 
vinc)
SI NO 1994, President Weak
Bolivia SI SI SI SI 2004, 2008 and 2009 President; 2006,2008 Opposition Strong
Brasil Si1 SI(No vinc) SI SI 1993 Mandatory; 2005 Parliament Medium
Chile NO SI (excep)2 NO NO 1978, 1980, 1988 Militar Regim; 1989 Constitutional Ratification Weak5
Colombia SI SI NO SI 1990 electoral curt; 1997, 2005 President Medium 
Costa Rica NO NO NO SI 2007 President Medium
Ecuador SI SI SI SI 1979, 2008 Mandatory; 1986,1994,1995,1997, 2006,2007, President Strong
El Salvador SI NO NO NO -- Nule
Guatemala SI SI SI SI 1994 President, 1999 Mandatory Medium
Honduras NO SI SI SI -- Weak
México NO NO NO NO -- Nule
Nicaragua NO SI NO SI -- Weak
Panamá SI1 NO NO NO 1977, 1983 Militar Regime;1992, 1998, 2006 Mandatory Medium
Paraguay SI1 SI 3 SI SI -- Weak
Perú SI NO NO SI 1993 President Medium
Uruguay SI NO Si SI 1958,  1962,1966,  1971,  1980,1989,  1989,1992,1994, 
1994,1996,1999, 2003,2004
Strong
Venezuela SI SI SI Si 1999,1999,2002  President,  2007;  2004  Opposition;  2007,  2009 
Mandatory
Strong
Source: C2D Database (www.c2d.ch) Welp 2009
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(1) Referendum only can be called for political-administrative amendments in  Brazil and Colombia; and for territorial agreements between countries 
in El Salvador and Guatemala. In the rest of the countries in which mandatory referendum exists applies for constitutional ratifications. In Peru and 
Guatemala referendum can be avoided through legislative ratification. 
(2) In Chile the president can call a plebiscite only when there is a disagreement between executive and legislative powers. 
(3) In Paraguay the president needs the aproval of the parlament to call a referendum.
(4) The classification is based in both dimensions, law and practices: the influence of dd is considered Strong in countries in which laws and practices 
of dd have a clear effect in the policy making process; Medium are countries in which direct democracy had some influence although it includes 
both, countries with a developed law and few experiences (e.g. Colombia) or with some development in law and erratic practices (e.g Peru); as 
weak were classified countries with a narrow law and  irrelevant uses (e.g. Argentina); Nule are the countries without developments (For detailed 
information about the different countries see Welp 2009).
(5) Chile is classified considering the democratic period in which the law allowing dd is narrow and there weren't any practices.
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Table 6: ICT development by Latin American Governments. Statement of Condition
Country Orientation of the 
Government Portals1
Legislative portal2  Contract System3 Guides of procedures4  Level of Participation5
Argentina Citizen oriented Yes Transactional Informative Full
Bolivia Administrative Yes Transactional Informative Full
Brazil Citizen oriented Yes Informative Transactional Full
Chile Administrative Yes Transactional Transactional Intermediate
Colombia Citizen oriented Yes Transactional Informative Intermediate
Costa Rica Citizen oriented Yes Informative Informative Intermediate
Ecuador Government Yes Transactional --- Basic
El Salvador Citizen oriented Yes --- Transactional Basic
Guatemala Government Yes Transactional --- Full
Honduras Administrative No Transactional --- Intermediate
Mexico Citizen oriented Yes --- Informative Full
Nicaragua Administrative Yes --- Informative Intermediate
Panama Citizen oriented Yes Transactional Transactional Intermediate
Paraguay Government Yes Informative --- Intermediate
Peru Citizen oriented Yes Transactional Transactional Intermediate
Uruguay Administrative Yes Informative --- Basic
Venezuela Administrative Yes --- Informative Full
Source: Self-reported data. A complete report can be consulted in Welp 2007
(1) Orientation of the Government  Portals. Government: information about the activity of the Executive Power. Administrative: administrative information 
organized according to the offering of the administration;  Citizen Oriented: administrative information organized according to the citizens’ demand (by 
profiles and subjects rather than by departments, easily accessible in terms of vocabulary and organization).
(2) Legislative Portal. Existence (Yes/No)
(3) Contract System: State contracting and procurement systems. Informative: only supply of information or Transactional: transactions are allowed. 
(4) Guides of Procedures. Existence and level of development. Informative: only supply of information or Transactional: transactions are allowed.
(5) Level of participation of the channels in the website:  Basic: Mailbox, Symbolic participation.  Intermediate: mailbox and proposals or interactive channels.  Fully: 
mailbox, Proposals (demands, complaints and proposals from an individual) and Interactive (interactive participation) spaces for citizen interaction to make proposals.
31
